Throughout the developed world, and in France in particular, economic crises are managed very differently. Wars are managed simply and effectively: a war aim, a war leader, a national consensus, an analysis of enemy forces, a strategy, tactics and means. And then one sees the most uncertain heads of state transformed into determined strategist through contact with their generals.

On the contrary, economic crises most of the time in a democracy, are managed without a clear purpose, without national consensus, without analysis of hostile forces, without strategy, and with indecisive, multiple and conflicting leaders. As a result recent history has shown that even those who know how to win the most difficult wars of movement get bogged down in endless economic and social conflicts. Indeed, leaders would even prefer to enter into military conflicts instead of making economic choices.

Moreover, by definition the enemies in an international conflict are not voters; so political powers have no reason to keep them sweet. Unlike all those who, in the country, have something to lose within any economic reform globally beneficial. One is more likely to be popular in taking the route of conflict than in launching a series of reforms. And in certain historical circumstances particularly tragic, the peoples eventually even entrusted the management of the economic crisis to the military.

In France, this line of reasoning applies perfectly today: the current President of the Republic, like his predecessor, seems to be more comfortable in military crisis management than in economic crisis management.

In one case, he decides clearly and resolutely to start the military intervention of an excellent army, under a unified command, to win a war with the approval of most of the country. And recently this was done in the case of Libya, Mali, Central African Republic (CAR).

In another case, they both did not dare to decide, reform, make as much progress as necessary, for fear of upsetting a particular group.

If a war leader were looking to be the barycentre of his lieutenant forces, he would be certain to lose every battle. The same goes for economic warfare. And so history has taught us that a great country cannot conduct major reforms, to combat an economic crisis, unless it uses the same methods as those it uses to engage in armed conflict: a clear analysis of all operating forces, a determined leader, a clearly stated war aim, the construction of a national consensus as large as possible, on this war aim. And the lucid analysis of the tolerable levels as to the victims of casualties.

So today we would love to see the acknowledgement that we are fighting an economic war, of ministers united, forming a real emergency task force around him, acting without batting an eyelid, around a determined president.

And let it not be said that the management of an economic crisis is more complex than that of a war: in both cases, it involves the lives of men and women, facing events sometimes tragic and changing. We must, therefore, learn to fight the crisis with the same determination, the same lack of thirst for popularity, the same decorum, the same stage work, the same vocabulary than engaging an outside enemy.

In both cases, the country is in danger.

j@attali.com